◆ 次回のセミナー

2010年1月13日（水）18:00-19:30 伊藤公一朗 (UCバークリー) "The Effect of Financial Incentives on Energy Conservation: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in the California 20/20 Program" Abstract: This study examines how financial incentives affect household energy consumption by exploiting a quasi experiment in the California 20/20 rebate program. In 2005, most residents in California were entitled to a 20% discount for entire summer electricity bills by reducing 20% of their electricity use relative to 2004. To participate in the program, one must have opened an electricity account by a certain cutoff date in 2004, although all eligible households automatically enrolled in. This eligibility rule excluded self-selection, and generated essentially random assignment among households who opened their accounts near the cutoff date. Using household-level monthly billing data from the three California investor owned utilities, I find the following three preliminary results. First, the rebate incentive induces about 10% reductions in electricity use in inland areas where summer temperature is persistently high, whereas such effects are precisely close to zero in the coastal areas where summer temperature is moderate. Second, during the four-month summer billing period, the treatment effect is largest in the last month and monotonically decreases toward the first month. Finally, the data of the control groups reveal that about 15% of the households would receive rebates even in absence of the program due to year-to-year fluctuations in electricity consumption. As a result, although the program is effective for a certain type of household, the overall efficiency cost tends to be high when it has little effect in heavily populated areas.

◆ 今後の予定

2010年1月22日（金）16:30-18:00 服部圭介 (大阪経済大学) "Firm Incentives for Environmental R&D under Non-cooperative and Cooperative Policies" Abstract: This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly, and compares them under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. It is shown that under any policy regime firm incentives are either excessive or insufficient from a welfare point of view, depending on the marginal environmental damage and the degree of emission spillovers. In addition, if the marginal damage is relatively large, a quantity instrument encourages innovation more than a price instrument. Further, under either regime of price and quantity regulations, policy cooperation (harmonization) necessarily enhances welfare in each country, but it does not necessarily increase firms' innovation incentives.

◆ 環境経済学セミナーについて

京都大学「環境経済学セミナー」は、環境・資源経済学の研究者を学内外から広くお招きし、最新の研究に関する報告と討論を行うことを目的として不定期に開催するものです。 専門分野や所属を問わず、どなたでも自由にご参加いただけます。事前の申し込みなども必要ありません。 　　　　　　　　　　　　 主催：植田和弘研究室 運営担当：横尾英史、阪本浩章 問い合わせ：enveconkyoto(at)gmail.com